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The Ebola virus epidemic in West Africa is on the brink 
of entering a second phase in which the (inter)national 
efforts to slow down virus transmission will be engaged 
to end the epidemic. The response community must 
consider the longevity of their current laboratory sup-
port, as it is essential that diagnostic capacity in the 
affected countries be supported beyond the end of the 
epidemic. The emergency laboratory response should 
be used to support building structural diagnostic and 
outbreak surveillance capacity.
As of 18 March 2015, the Ebola epidemic in West Africa 
has resulted in more than 10,194 deaths and more 
than 24,701 cases, however the most recent situation 
reports from the World Health Organization (WHO) [1] 
suggest that the weekly number of new cases in the 
first months of 2015 has been the lowest since June 
2014. All indications therefore suggest that the epi-
demic has entered a second phase, making the end of 
the epidemic a real possibility. Importantly however, 
the feasibility of eradication of Ebola virus disease 
(EVD) in the human population in West Africa remains 
completely dependent on the sustained commitment of 
everyone involved in the response until all cases have 
been identified and transmission chains have stopped. 
This is illustrated by the slight increase in cases in 
Sierra Leone and Guinea reported in the first weeks of 
February [1].
One of the pillars of the response to this outbreak 
has been the provision of laboratory support that has 
facilitated the rapid testing of suspected cases [2,3]. 
The lack of laboratory capacity during the early stages 
of the epidemic will undoubtedly have been a contrib-
uting factor to the rapid expansion of the epidemic. 
With the aid of the international community, in-country 
laboratory capacity is no longer a significant limiting 
factor with respect to testing of patient samples and 
the turnaround time for samples in most areas is less 
than 24 hours, rather than several days as during the 
early days of the epidemic [4]. Given that the end of the 
epidemic is now a real possibility, we feel it is essential 
to begin active discussions with national agencies, the 
WHO and potential sponsors, regarding a ‘post-Ebola 
legacy’ of laboratory support. Several countries have 
been involved in the deployment of in total 27 labo-
ratories to provide rapid in-country testing for Ebola 
virus (EBOV) [1,4]. The laboratories deployed in the 
region are equipped to do molecular diagnostic test-
ing, which has become the standard of care in clinical 
microbiology in other parts of the world. Therefore, the 
basic laboratory set-up currently provided in the EBOV 
response could be in the future extended to develop 
essential clinical and public health microbiology ser-
vices also for other diseases.
With the decreasing number of patients in the EVD 
holding and treatment centres, the number of labora-
tory requests are falling rapidly, to the point that the 
conditions for laboratory testing need to be redefined. 
With the transition to the second phase of the EVD out-
break, a transition from acute testing for clinical triage 
to surveillance testing is needed, in which the threshold 
for the case definition should be lower, to demonstrate 
the absence of EBOV in the local population. In addi-
tion, it is widely accepted that the epidemic has had an 
impact way beyond the individuals infected with EBOV, 
the consequences of which will only become apparent 
long after the epidemic is over [5-7]. This impact is evi-
dent at many levels, including healthcare services and 
laboratory support for the detection of other circulat-
ing pathogens. Minor modifications of the procedures 
currently in use in the affected countries would make 
it possible to establish PCR-based diagnostic tests for 
a selected number of endemically circulating patho-
gens and could, as we enter the second phase of the 
epidemic, provide interim laboratory support to reduce 
the overall impact of the epidemic on public health by 
timely detection of endemic diseases enabling treat-
ment and guiding control measures. If planned stra-
tegically, this could be a first step on the road to a 
sustained local laboratory infrastructure that will pro-
vide access to up-to-date facilities. Local laboratory 
experts took care of such activities with very limited 
resources before the start of the EVD outbreak; in the 
transition phase, it is therefore crucial to engage with 
these partners in order to discuss the way forward.
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The international community must consider the longev-
ity of their support, as it is essential that diagnostic 
capacity in the affected countries is supported beyond 
the end of the EVD epidemic. So far, the laboratories 
have largely been operated by teams of volunteers, 
flown in on a rotation of four to six weeks from research 
and public health laboratories around the world. With 
the outbreak ending, some laboratories will be closed 
in the coming months. We foresee an all too familiar 
pattern: equipment is left unused after an outbreak 
or even removed from the country because local staff 
lack the necessary training and affordable reagents 
and equipment are not available [8-10]. By building on 
the expertise in country and using the infrastructure 
currently present, the network of diagnostic and pub-
lic health laboratories could be strengthened, strate-
gically placed to facilitate reliable logistics as well as 
population coverage. Such a network should be capa-
ble of both routine and response modes and could be 
supported through telemedicine programmes, training 
programmes outside and within the country and inter-
national reference laboratories to provide improved 
access to additional laboratory services.
Rather than copying the workflows used in the United 
States and Europe, it is essential that fit-for-purpose 
diagnostic algorithms are developed, such as a com-
bined laboratory package to diagnose sickle cell anae-
mia, infection with human immunodeficiency virus 
and hepatitis B virus, coupled with essential haema-
tology and clinical chemistry as well as the ability to 
rule out EVD and Lassa fever in maternity clinics. A 
large advantage of the molecular era is that the divi-
sion between clinical and public health work becomes 
blurred, creating an opportunity to kill two birds with 
one stone. It is time to step away from the ‘one path-
ogen-one laboratory network’ approach, which raises 
costs tremendously but is the standard set by interna-
tional reference centres [11-15]. This is by no means an 
easy task, as it requires collaborative and out-of-the-
box thinking. It also requires novel research to provide 
low-cost solutions and alternatives for the expensive 
assays that are currently available. The most com-
monly used EBOV laboratory test costs ca EUR 45 per 
patient (for diagnosis and pre-discharge testing). We 
invite suppliers and manufacturers of key laboratory 
equipment and reagents to suggest more affordable 
solutions that take into consideration the limited local 
cold chain capacity and to provide adequate regional 
technical support. Innovative solutions such as open 
source laboratory equipment may be one possibility to 
make equipment accessible.
The current epidemic and previous serological surveys 
[16] indicate that EBOV and other highly virulent path-
ogens are circulating in West Africa and will continue 
to do so beyond the end of the current epidemic. The 
reality is that EVD is likely to remain a problem in West 
Africa and this will not be the last epidemic we see in 
this area. The establishment of an integrated network 
of support laboratories would strengthen epidemic 
preparedness and response capabilities for the inevita-
ble introductions of highly pathogenic zoonotic patho-
gens in the local human population.
Conflict of interest
None declared.
Authors’ contributions
All authors: design and writing of manuscript.
References
1. World Health Organization (WHO). Ebola data and statistics. 
Situation summary. Data published on 18 March 2015. Geneva: 
WHO; 19 Mar 2015. Available from: http://apps.who.int/ebola/
current-situation/ebola-situation-report-18-march-2015
2. Chowell D, Castillo-Chavez C, Krishna S, Qiu X, Anderson 
KS. Modelling the effect of early detection of Ebola. Lancet 
Infect Dis. 2015;15(2):148-9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1473-
3099(14)71084-9 PMID:25749063
3. Dhillon RS, Srikrishna D, Garry RF, Chowell G. Ebola control: 
rapid diagnostic testing. Lancet Infect Dis. 2015;15(2):147-8. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(14)71035-7</jrn>
4. World Health Organization (WHO). Ebola data and statistics. 
Situation summary. Data published on 21 January 2015. 
Geneva: WHO; 19 Mar 2015. Available from: http://apps.
who.int/ebola/en/status-outbreak/situation-reports/
ebola-situation-report-21-january-2015
5. Check Hayden E. Ebola outbreak shuts down malaria-
control efforts. Nature. 2014;514(7520):15-6. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1038/514015a PMID:25279895
6. Edelstein M, Angelides P, Heymann DL. Ebola: the 
challenging road to recovery. Lancet. 2015 Feb 9. pii: S0140-
6736(15)60203-3. [Epub ahead of print]. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/S0140-6736(15)60203-3
7. Takahashi S, Metcalf CJ, Ferrari MJ, Moss WJ, Truelove 
SA, Tatem AJ, et al. Reduced vaccination and the risk of 
measles and other childhood infections post-Ebola. Science. 
2015;347(6227):1240-2. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.
aaa3438 PMID:25766232
8. Petti CA, Polage CR, Quinn TC, Ronald AR, Sande MA. 
Laboratory medicine in Africa: a barrier to effective health 
care. Clin Infect Dis. 2006;42(3):377-82. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1086/499363 PMID:16392084
9. Bates I, Maitland K. Are laboratory services coming of age in 
sub-Saharan Africa? Clin Infect Dis. 2006;42(3):383-4. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1086/499368 PMID:16392085
10. Ndihokubwayo JB, Kasolo FN, Yahaya AA, Mwenda J. 
Strengthening Public Health Laboratories in the WHO African 
Region: A Critical Need for Disease Control. Report World 
Health Organization Regional Office for Africa.; 23 March 2015. 
Available from: https://www.aho.afro.who.int/sites/default/
files/ahm/reports/20/ahm12pages47to52.pdf
11. World Health Organization (WHO). Rotavirus Laboratory 
network. Geneva: WHO; 2015. . [Accessed: 23 Mar 2015] 
Available from: http://www.who.int/immunization/
monitoring_surveillance/burden/laboratory/Rotavirus/en/
12. World Health Organization (WHO). WHO HPV Laboratory 
Network. Geneva: WHO. [Accessed: 23 Mar 2015]. Available 
from: http://www.who.int/biologicals/vaccines/hpv/en/
13. World Health Organization (WHO). Laboratory network. 
Geneva: WHO. [Accessed: 23 Mar 2015]. Available from: http://
www.who.int/hiv/topics/drugresistance/laboratory/en/
14. World Health Organization (WHO). The Global 
Polio Laboratory Network (GPLN) Geneva: WHO. 
[Accessed: 23 Mar 2015]. Available from: http://www.
polioeradication.org/Dataandmonitoring/Surveillance/
GlobalPolioLaboratoryNetwork.aspx
15. World Health Organization (WHO). Measles and rubella 
laboratory network. Geneva: WHO. [Accessed: 23 Mar 2015]. 
Available from: http://www.wpro.who.int/immunization/
laboratory/measles_rubella/en/
16. Schoepp RJ, Rossi CA, Khan SH, Goba A, Fair JN. Undiagnosed 
acute viral febrile illnesses, Sierra Leone. Emerg Infect Dis. 
2014;20(7):1176-82. http://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid2007.131265 
PMID:24959946
